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Statement of the Case
Nature of the case

This case is the latest iteration of an easement location and trespass dispute,
which has been before this Court twice already. Basically there was a dispute by
WHITE and MORTENSEN against AKERS as to whether, and where, they had an
easement over AKERS's property to access adjoining property that was intended
to be developed. WHITE and MORTENSEN resorted to self-help and allegedly
went outside the easement, resulting in considerable difficulty. AKERS sued for
trespass and The District Court found damages, punitive damages, treble damages
and awarded attorneys fees.
The latest decision, No. 33587/33694 entered 6/4/2008, resulted in a remand
to determine the precise location of the easement claimed by WHITE and
MORTENSEN, and whether damages previously awarded remained appropriate in
light of that location determination. MARTI MORTENSEN is now divorced from
VERNON MORTENSEN and seeks to avoid liability for VERNON's punitive
damage liability. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 206,207.
Proceedings Below
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Originally filed January 10, 2002, this dispute was tried beginning in
September, 2002 and heard in sections though December, 2003. Judgment was
entered 05/25/2004 and appealed. This court reversed and remanded the case in
January, 2006. An amended jUdgment on remand was entered in December, 2006
and again appealed. This Court again reversed and remanded the matter by
decision dated June 10, 2008.
Substantial additional proceedings occurred thereafter in District Court, in
the nature of motion practice - there was no new testimony taken. Judge Mitchell
finally entered his decision and Fourth Amended Judgement and Decree on
Second Remand August 10,2011. Tr. Vol. 3 P.606.
In particular MARTI MORTENSEN moved to avoid application of Punitive
Damages to her. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 209. AKERS objected, Tr. Vol. 1 p. 217 and the
District Court struck MARTI MORTENSEN's motion. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 226.
MARTI MORTENSEN and VERNON MORTENSEN filed a notice of
appeal on September 21, 2011. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 642. However a post-trial motion
had been previously filed by Defendants WHITE, Tr, Vol. 3 p. 610, so this matter
was held in abeyance pending resolution of those motions. Those motions were
-2-

decided and WHITE filed a notice of appeal on 12113/2011. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 702.
MARTI MORTENSEN is filing a separate motion to consolidate those appeals.
Statement of Facts

The statement of facts in Akers v. Mortensen No. 33587/33694 entered
6/4/2008 is attached as appendix A.

Subsequent briefing addressed the location of the easement and the
applicability of various damages elements, but no new testimony was taken.
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Issues Presented on Appeal
1. Did the Court below properly fix the size and location of the easement?
2. Are the amount of punitive damages awarded against VERNON MORTENSEN
and MARTI MORTENSEN justified by the facts.
3. Are the Attorneys Fees awarded against VERNON MORTENSEN and MARTI
MORTENSEN justified by the facts.
4. May MARTI MORTENSEN assert a claim to avoid imposition of punitive
damages against her?
5. Should Judge Mitchell have recused himself?

Attorney Fees on Appeal
MARTI MORTENSEN does not seek attorneys fees on appeal.
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Argument

MARTI MORTENSEN submits the following memorandum regarding
burdens of proof.
1. Location of Easement

MARl MORTENSEN adopts as her argument the arguments presented by
Appellants WHITE and VERNON MORTENSEN and incorporates the same
herein by reference as if fully set forth.
2. Punitive Damages

This Court ruled in Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 205 P.3d 1175
(2009):
Without a determination of Appellants' easement rights, it is
impossible to determine the scope of Appellants' trespass. Therefore,
we vacate the district court's award of damages for negligent
infliction of emotional distress and remand the issue for further
determination after the district court determines Appellants' easement
rights. For the same reason, we vacate the district court's award of
punitive damages in favor of the Akers.
There was in fact an easement, 12.2 feet wide following a'shepard's crook'
pathway, and WHITE and MORTENSEN had the right to use that path. The
District Court found that VERNON MORTENSEN's trespass occurred outside of
-5-

that easement.
An award of punitive damages will be sustained only when it is shown that
the defendant acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation from reasonable
standards of conduct, and that the act was performed by the defendant with an
understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences." Cheney v. Palos
Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661,669 (1983).
In this case the District Court found MORTENSEN's actions were
knowingly done outside the scope of that easement. MORTENSEN submits that
since the exact location was unknown and not determined until recently, the
requisite mental state of intent cannot be shown. The only issue should be
whether it was reasonable for MORTENSEN to believe that the actions taken were
occurring within the easement.
More important, the amount of the award exceeds the limits suggested by
this court in Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972) and modified
by Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 904-905, 665 P.2d 661,
668-669 (1983). In the latter the court held that:
While no concrete formula for an award of punitive damages will control,
-6-

the discretion of the trial judge will continue to be exercised within the
general advisory guidelines laid down by this Court in the past. Mindful of
the purpose of punitive damage awards, we note that they are not favored in
the law and therefore should be awarded only in the most unusual and
compelling circumstances. They are to be awarded cautiously and within
narrow limits .... An award of punitive damages will be sustained on appeal
only when it is shown that the defendant acted in a manner that was "an
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act
was performed by the defendant with an understanding of or disregard for
its likely consequences." ... The justification for punitive damages must be
that the defendant acted with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether
that state be termed "malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence" ... or
simply "deliberate or willful" [Citations omitted]
In this case the award goes far beyond deterrence and is merely punishment.
VERNON MORTENSEN is unlikely to get into easement disputes again: MARTI
MORTENSEN will certainly never get into such a dispute since she doesn't do
property development and is no longer married to VERNON. As such the policy
of punitive damages is not served applying them in this amount and to MARTI.
3. Attorneys Fees

AKERS brought several causes of action but did not prevail on all of them.
Their entitlement to attorneys fees flows from IRC 6-202 and applies only to those
fees incurred to enforce the trespass provisions of that statute.

Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,862 P.2d 321 (1993) recognizes
-7-

that fees must be apportioned:
Gary is correct with respect to his assertion that where the parties have
succeeded on entirely separate claims, those claims are properly
distinguished and should be analyzed separately in determining whether
attorney fees are appropriate .... We also note, however, that the trial court
is authorized to award attorney fees only as provided by statute or contract. .
. . In this case, the court based its award of fees on I.C. § 6-202. That statute,
which applies to claims for intentional and wilful trespass, mandates an
award of reasonable attorney fees in an action "brought to enforce the terms
of this act if the plaintiff prevails." Id. As applied to the case at hand, this
statute authorized the district court to award fees only to Kent, "the
plaintiff' in that action, and then to award only those fees reasonably
incurred in prosecuting the trespass action upon which he prevailed. Hence,
even though the court found that Gary had prevailed on some of the claims
asserted, it found no statutory basis upon which he would be entitled to any
offsetting award. Consequently, and contrary to Gary's position, there was
no basis for the court to apportion fees between the parties. Rather, the court
was required to award Kent his full reasonable attorney fee attributable to
his successful trespass claim. It is clear from the district court's
memorandum opinion and order awarding attorney fees that the court
considered the fact that a substantial amount of Kent's efforts were directed
at claims upon which he did not prevail, specifically citing Kent's claim for
trespass to the beach end of his property and Kent's claim for emotional
distress. The court found, however, that some of the legal work performed
on those claims overlapped with Kent's successful claim for trespass to the
west end of his lot, and that Kent was entitled to recover those fees .....
Based upon its findings, which Gary does not dispute here, the court
allocated one-half of all Kent's attorney fees, or $18,532.75, to the
prosecution of the successful trespass claim. Upon this record, we conclude
that the district court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and
consistent with the legal standards applicable to its decision.
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The burden to allocate fees must fall to AKERS as the party claiming fees. In this
case the record does not reflect an apportionment of fees.
4. Punitive Damages Allocable to MARTI MORTENSEN
A.

This Court should Rule That Punitive Damages may not be
Collected from a Divorced Spouse

It is undisputed in this case that any punitive damages that may be awarded

against MORTENSENS will be based upon actions by VERNON MORTENSEN;
MARTI MORTENSEN was not present and did not herse1fparticipate in any way
in those actions.
1.

Basis of Community Liability for Intentional Torts of
Spouse

As a general rule, community property of a spouse is subject to execution
for intentional torts of the other spouse; but Idaho has not applied that rule to
punitive damages.
In Hansen v. Blevins, 84 Idaho 49,367 P.2d 758 (1962), Blevins, who
operated the community property bar, sprayed tear gas into the face of Hansen, a
customer, who sued and recovered damages which he sought to satisfy from the
wife's share of community assets. The court analyzed decisions from several other
-9-

states and concluded,
It is not necessary to a decision in this case to determine whether

community property is liable in all cases for the payment of obligations
incurred by the tort of the husband. Here the record shows that the
defendant committed the battery while he was actively and actually engaged
in the management of the community business, and that what he did was
intended to be for the protection of community property and in the
interest of the community business. Under such circumstances the
community is responsible for his acts. McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110,
74 P.2d 1181; McHenry v. Short, 29 Wash.2d 263, 186 P.2d 900; 41 C.J.S.
Husband and Wife § 523. [Emphasis added]

The McFadden decision cited by the Court explained,
It is not necessary, however, in order to bind the community, that the act

which gives rise to the obligation, though tortious in its nature, shall
actually benefit the community. It is sufficient that it was committed by the
spouse with the bona fide intention of protecting the interest of the
community, and it makes no difference that the act was a mistake in
judgment -- a tort so far as it affected the rights of other people and
ultimately detrimental to the interest of the community. [Emphasis added]
McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110, 113,74 P.2d 1181 (1938). Similarly in
McHenry v. Short, 29 Wash.2d 263, 186 P.2d 900 (1947) the husband was in the

act of ejecting the victim from premises which the community claimed to own, so
the husband was acting in pursuance of his management of community property or
in the furtherance of community business.
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Then in Hegg v. Internal Revenue Serv., 136 Idaho 61, 28 P.3d 1004 (2001)
this Court ruled,
We have not previously addressed the issue of whether the community
is liable for all tort obligations, even those which might be
characterized as separate, and because of the nature of the tort
obligation in this case, it is not necessary for us to reach that issue here.
. . . . Community assets may be reached to satisfy a debt incurred by one
spouse's fraud committed during marriage even if the other spouse is
completely innocent of the fraud and has no personal liability where the
fraud benefits the community or occurs during the spouse's management of
the community.
2.

Idaho has not Decided if a Community is Liable for
Punitive Damages

The general rule set out in Hansen and Hegg applies to intentional torts, but
not necessarily to punitive damages. Punitive damages require more than mere
intent: they require willful and malicious conduct. Once a spouse engages in
willfully malicious conduct, he is no longer seeking to benefit the community.
The justification for punitive damages must be that the defendant acted with
an extremely harmful state of mind, whether that state be termed "malice,
oppression, fraud or gross negligence"; "malice, oppression, wantonness";
or simply "deliberate or willful."

Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc. 122 Idaho 47, 830 P.2d 1185
(1991), quoting Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d
-11-

661, 669 (1983).
The punitive damages award against MORTENSENS is based upon trespass
and aggressive actions by VERNON MORTENSEN while trespassing. Similar
conduct was found to support punitive damages in Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho
683,496 P.2d 682 (1972).
A.

Punitive Damages Against Agent Not Automatically
Imputed to Principal

Idaho may impose liability on a principal for intentional misconduct of an
agent. Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937,854 P.2d 280
(1993). But Idaho does not automatically impose punitive damages against a
principal for the acts of an agent. Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc.,
supra, held:
It is settled beyond dispute in Idaho that a principal is liable for punitive

damages based on the acts of its agent only in circumstances in which
the principal participated, or in which the principal authorized or
ratified the agent's conduct. ... Furthermore, it is well established that
punitive damages may not be assessed against a principal based upon
the acts of an agent absent a clear showing of authorization or
ratification.
Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., 138 Idaho 315, 322, 63 P.3d 441,448 (2003)
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interpreted Manning to require that:
To recover punitive damages against a corporation, one must show that an
officer or director participated in, or ratified, the conduct underlying the
punitive damage award.
Accord: Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp. 140 Idaho 416 95 P.3d 34 (2004).

B.

Punitive Damages are not Automatically imputed to a
Codefendant

Verheyen v. Dewey, 27 Idaho 1, 146 P. 1116 (1915) held that even if one
defendant was prompted by malicious motives in the acts that he did, the other
defendant cannot be made liable on account of the malicious motives of his
codefendant unless his codefendant is implicated in such malice.

C.

Purpose of Punitive Damages is Deterrence

Finally we note that the primary purpose for punitive damages is deterrence
of similar conduct. Linscott v. Rainier National Life Insurance Co., 100 Idaho 854,
606 P.2d 958 (1980).

3.

In This Case Punitives Should not Apply to MARTI
MORTENSEN

Punitive damages were awarded against VERNON MORTENSEN due to
his intentional, malicious actions in trespassing on AKERS' property without
-13-

knowing there was an easement. This Court may decide to reimpose punitives
once the exact easement is determined.
MARTI MORTENSEN did not participate or even know about the actions
of VERNON MORTENSEN, did not authorize or ratify his actions, and has since
divorced VERNON (although the divorce is not complete as to property
distribution).
However, the various policies embodied in the case law strongly argue that
a Community should not be responsible for a spouse's conduct that supports
punitive damages.
•

Idaho cases making the Community liable for intentional torts are based
upon agency principles, that the wrongdoer spouse was acting to benefit or
protect the community.

•

The punitive damages cases require the wrongdoer to go beyond mere
intent, and to have acted with specific malice.

•

Idaho recognizes that malice does not impute to the principal, even though
intent may be imputed, unless the principal participates, authorizes or
ratifies the malicious conduct.
-14-

•

The purpose of punitive damages, deterrence, is not served by charging an
innocent spouse with her husband's wrongdoing.

•

Finally in this case, the marital community has, since the time of the
incident, been terminated.
Based on this analysis, the court should conclude that a marital community

- or more precisely, the other spouse's half of the marital community - is not
liable for punitive damages asserted against one spouse, and no judgment should
enter against the innocent spouse individually or jointly.
B.

MARTI MORTENSEN should be permitted to raise this issue on
remand

AKERS argued that the issues raised by MARTI MORTENSEN as to the
applicability of punitive damages to her as a divorced spouse, were outside the
scope of the remand.
1. Scope of Remand
This Court may determine whether punitive damages should apply jointly
and severally to MARTI MORTENSEN. In Mountainview Landowners Co-op.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 136 P.3d 332 (2006) the Court held that:
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"Issues not raised below but raised for the first time on appeal will not be
considered or reviewed." .... However, "[t]he general rule is that, on
remand, a trial court has authority to take actions it is specifically directed to
take, or those which are subsidiary to the actions directed by the
appellate court."

State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101,1104 (2000) involved a remand
in a criminal case due to a suppression issue; the District Court permitted Hosey to
withdraw his guilty plea on remand. The Court stated,
There is no question that had we reversed the denial of the motion to
suppress, yet remained silent about the withdrawal of the plea, the trial court
would have had jurisdiction to allow Hosey to withdraw the guilty plea, if
such an action complied with the terms of the plea agreement, because the
withdrawal of the plea would clearly be a subsidiary action to the Court's
reversal of the denial of the motion to suppress. This case is no different.
Hosey's motion to withdraw his plea was within the trial court's jurisdiction
on remand because ruling on the effect of an appellate court's decision
under the terms of a plea agreement is necessarily subsidiary to any other
directive on remand where a defendant has entered a conditional guilty plea.

Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 205 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2009) specifically
included the issue of joint and several liability in its remand:
The district court awarded Sherrie Akers $10,000 for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, for which Appellants are jointly and severally liable.
To support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a party
must prove a breach of a recognized legal duty. Nation v. State, Dept. of
Carr., 144 Idaho 177, 191, 158 P.3d 953,967 (2007). In the instant case, the
district court predicated the award of damages for negligent infliction of
-16-

emotional distress on Appellants' malicious behavior while trespassing on
the Akers' property. As we indicated in Akers I, the question of damages
flowing from Appellants' conduct is inseparable from consideration of
Appellants' easement rights. Akers I, 142 Idaho at 304, 127 P.3d at 207.
Without a determination of Appellants' easement rights, it is impossible to
determine the scope of Appellants' trespass. Therefore, we vacate the
district court's award of damages for negligent infliction of emotional
distress and remand the issue for further determination after the
district court determines Appellants' easement rights. For the same
reason, we vacate the district court's award of punitive damages in
favor of the Akers. [Emphasis added]
MARTI MORTENSEN'S assertion of the issue of Community liability for
punitive damages due to her husband's actions, is logically subsidiary to the
determination of whether punitive damages apply at all. More simply, the entire
issue of damages was put back on the table by the Supreme Court; this Court may
consider whatever aspects thereof it chooses.
2. New Events

The original damages award was back in 2004; the MORTENSENS'
divorce, which gave rise to this issue, did not occur until 2006. Hence the issue of
whether punitive damages should apply to a divorced spouse was not ripe at the
time of the original trial since the facts giving rise had not occurred yet. E.g., Bell

Rapids Mut. Irrigation Co. v. Hausner, 126 Idaho 752, 754, 890 P.2d 338, 340
-17-

(1995).
MARTI MORTENSEN submits that the issue of punitive damages applying
to her could not have been raised at the first trial, but is within the scope of the
current remand.
5. Recusal

MARTI MORTENSEN respectfully echoes the argument of other
Appellants that Judge Mitchell should have recused himself.
Conclusion

MARTI MORTENSEN asks that this Court reverse the decision of the
District Courted and remand with instructions that MARTI MORTENSEN not be
assessed punitive damages, that Attorneys fees be apportioned, that Judge Mitchell
be directed to recuse, and that all other relief requested by Appellants wrnTE and
VERNON MORTENSEN be granted.
May 31, 2012

Attorney for MARTI MORTENSEN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Dustin Deissner certifies:
I have on this date served the foregoing document upon the following
parties by the following means:
BY:

TO:
VERNON J. MORTENSEN
POBOX 1922
BONNERS FERRY ID 83805

[X] US Mail 1st Class Postage Prepaid
[ ] Delivery Service
[ ] Facsimile to:

Robert Covington,
8884 N Government Way, Ste A
Hayden, ID 83835

[] US Mail 1st Class Postage Prepaid
[ ] Delivery Service
[X] Facsimile to: 208-762-4546

Leander James
Susan Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks, P. A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[X] US Mail 1st Class Postage Prepaid
[ ] Delivery Service
[ ] Facsimile to: (208) 664-1684

Dated May 31, 2012

Dustin Deissner
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APPENDIX A
Akers v. Mortensen Decision
Attached
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 33587/33694

DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L.
AKERS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E. )
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,
)
Defendants-Appellants,
and
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.
)
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. )
)
AKERS, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
DAVID L. WHITE and MICHELLE V.
WHITE, husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
VERNON J. MORTENSEN and MARTI E.
MORTENSEN, husband and wife,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

Defendants.
)
----------------------------------

Lewiston, March 2008 Term
2008 Opinion No. 68
Filed: June 4, 2008
Stephen Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge.
The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the district court are vacated, and
the case is remanded.
Givens Pursley, LLP, Boise, for appellants Mortensen. Terri Yost argued.
Robert Covington, Hayden, for appellants White.
James Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d'Alene, for respondents. Susan Weeks
argued.

HORTON, Justice
This appeal arises from a bench trial concerning an easement and trespass dispute.
Vernon and Marti Mortensen, David and Michelle White, and D.L. White Construction, Inc.
(hereinafter collectively referred to as "Appellants")

appeal the district court's judgment

regarding the existence, scope, and location of Appellants' easement across Respondents Dennis
and Sherrie Akers' property and the district court's award of compensatory and punitive
damages for trespass and emotional distress.

This Court previously decided an appeal

concerning this case in Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 127 P.3d 196 (2005)

(Akers I). We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are set out in detail in Akers I. There are four parcels of property
involved in this case: "Government Lot 2," "Parcel A," "Parcel B" and the "Reynolds Property."
The four parcels are rectangular and meet together at a four-way comer. Government Lot 2 is
located to the northeast, and Parcel B is to the northwest. The Akers own the southwestern
comer of Government Lot 2 and the southeastern comer of Parcel B. Parcel A is located to the
southwest and much of Parcel A, including that adjoining Parcel B, is owned by the Whites. The
Mortensens own a portion of Parcel A located to the south of that owned by the Whites. The
Reynolds Property is located to the southeast and is not owned by any of the parties to this
litigation. Together, the Whites and Mortensens plan to subdivide and develop their respective
properties.

2

Government Lot 2 is bisected roughly north to south by a county road, Millsap Loop
Road. Appellants hold an easement for ingress and egress to Millsap Loop Road across portions
of the Akers' property.

Because the properties meet at a four-way comer, Parcel A and

Government Lot 2 do not actually share a border. It is therefore physically impossible to access
Parcel A from Millsap Loop Road in Government Lot 2 without also passing through some other
property.
The Akers acquired their real property in 1980.

At the time of acquisition, a road

provided access to Parcel A, running through the southern portion of Government Lot 2 and the
southeastern comer of Parcel B. The access road was connected to Millsap Loop Road by an
approach (the original approach) that turned sharply north from the access road, which runs east
to west. The original approach was located on a blind curve in Millsap Loop Road. In order to
obtain a building permit, the Akers were required to alter the entrance point of the access road
where it connects to Millsap Loop Road, so that the entrance had a 30-foot line of sight in each
direction of Millsap Loop Road. The Akers constructed a new approach (the curved approach),
which starts to tum earlier and curves more gently to the north before meeting Millsap Loop
Road. The Akers eventually quarreled with the Whites' predecessors in interest, the Peplinskis,
over the Peplinskis' use of the access road, leading to the Peplinskis filing a lawsuit.

The

Peplinski/Akers suit ended in 1994 when the Peplinskis sold their property, including Parcel A,
to the Mortensens. The Mortensens later sold much of Parcel A, including that portion adjoining
Parcel B, to the Whites.
In January 2002, the Akers blocked Appellants' use of the curved approach to the access
road and forbade Appellants from traveling on the western end of the access road where it passes
through Parcel B before connecting to Appellants' property in Parcel A. Appellants then brought
in heavy equipment, including a bulldozer, to carve a route around the Akers' gate and to
otherwise alter the access road. This led to a series of confrontations between the Akers and
Appellants, as well as alleged damage to the Akers' property and alleged malicious behavior by
Appellants.
In response, the Akers filed the instant action for trespass, quiet title, and negligence.
During the trial, the district court personally viewed the access road and property in question.
The district court confirmed to Appellants an express easement 12.2 feet in width across the
Akers' property in Government Lot 2, through the original approach, but not the curved
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approach, to Millsap Loop Road. Although the district court confirmed Appellants' easement
across part of the Akers' land, the court found that the easement ended at the western boundary
of Government Lot 2 and did not cross into the Akers' property in Parcel B.
The district court also awarded the Akers compensatory damages ansmg from
Appellants' trespass in the amount of$17,002.85, which was trebled pursuant to I.C. § 6-202 for
a total of $51,008.55, to be paid by Appellants jointly and severally. Sherrie Akers was awarded
$10,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, also to be paid jointly and severally by
Appellants. Additionally, the district court entered punitive damage awards in favor of the Akers
against the Mortensens in the amount of $150,000 and against the Whites in the amount of
$30,000. Finally, the district court granted an award of costs and attorney fees to the Akers, to
be paid jointly and severally by the Mortensens and Whites, in the amount of $105,534.06.
Appellants appealed from that judgment and the dispute came before this Court in Akers

I.

This Court remanded the case to the district court for additional fact finding and a

determination regarding whether Appellants were entitled to a prescriptive easement or an
easement implied from prior use. Additionally, we vacated the award of damages, costs, and
attorney fees for further consideration in light of the district court's conclusions on remand
regarding the scope of Appellants' easement rights.
On remand, the district court concluded that Appellants were not entitled to an implied
easement from prior use because the access road was not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment
of the dominant estate, Parcel A. The district court based this conclusion of law on its finding
that, at the time of the severance of the dominant estate from the servient estate, there was a
second road that provided access to Parcel A. The district court concluded that Appellants were
entitled to a prescriptive easement across Government Lot 2, 12.2 feet in width, which was
coextensive with the scope and location of the express easement. The district court also found
the prescriptive easement passed from Government Lot 2 into Parcel B and immediately turned
ninety degrees to the south to provide access to Parcel A. Based on these findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the district court reinstated the award of damages, costs, and attorney fees
from Akers I, and awarded the Akers their costs and attorney fees on remand. Appellants timely
appealed from the district court's order on remand.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Review of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports
the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. Benninger

v. Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488, 129 P.3d 1235, 1237 (2006) (citing Alumet v. Bear Lake
Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253,256 (1991». Since it is the province of the trial
court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment
entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999) (citing Sun Valley

Shamrock Res., Inc. v. Travelers Leasing Corp., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794 P.2d 1389, 1391
(1990». A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are
clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006)
(citing Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 856, 55 P.3d 304, 310 (2002);

Bramwell v. South Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 P.3d 588, 590 (2001); LR.C.P
52(a». If the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is
conflicting, they will not be overturned on appeal. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at
1238 (citing Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998». This Court will
not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d
at 4 (citing Bramwell, 136 Idaho at 648, 39 P.3d at 588). The findings of the trial court on the
question of damages will not be set aside when based upon substantial and competent evidence.

Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2007) (citing
Idaho Falls Bonded Produce Supply Co. v. General Mills Rest. Group, Inc., 105 Idaho 46, 49,
665 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1983».
III. ANALYSIS

Both sides to this appeal ask this Court to finally resolve their dispute. We are unable to
fulfill their requests. We conclude that the district court's factual findings were based, in part,
upon impermissible reliance on a viewing of the property. Normally, we would remand the case
to the district court for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this
opinion. However, the parties have displayed a high degree of animosity towards each other and
the district judge. We conclude that it is in the best interest of all parties involved, including the
district judge, to vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new trial before a different
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district judge. Although this remedy is rarely exercised by this Court, we find it best serves the
interest of justice.
A. The district court erred when making factual findings relating to the scope and
location of Appellants' prescriptive easement.
The district court relied upon its personal on-site view of the subject property to find
certain facts relating to the scope of Appellants' prescriptive easement.

This was error.

Additionally, the district court's finding regarding the location of the easement on Parcel B was
not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
The district court's finding that Appellants' prescriptive easement was 12.2 feet wide was
based substantially on its view of the property.

The district court specifically found that:

"[Appellants'] argument that the easement should be 25 feet wide is simply unsupported by the
record and a view of the premises." Appellants argued that the easement should be 25 feet wide,
including ditches and shoulders. The district court, however, found that: "The view and the
exhibits show that not all of the length of the roadway has ditches on either or both sides, nor did
the view show any consistent 'shoulders.'" We conclude that the district court's reliance on its
site view was error. It is well established in Idaho that the knowledge obtained by a jury view of
a premises can only be used to determine the weight and applicability of the evidence introduced
at trial and that a view of the premises "is not of itself evidence upon which a verdict may be
based." Tyson Creek R.R. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 31 Idaho 580, 590,174 P. 1004, 1007 (1918).
When construing a prior Idaho statute that permitted a jury to view the premises in question, this
Court held: "'The purpose of the statute is not to permit the taking of evidence out of court, but
simply to permit the jury to view the place where the transaction is shown to have occurred, in
order that they may the better understand the evidence which has been introduced. ", State v.
McClurg, 50 Idaho 762, 796, 300 P. 898,911 (1931) (quoting State v. Main, 37 Idaho 449, 459,

216 P. 731, 734 (1923)). Although these cases involve a viewing of the property by a jury, for
purposes of appellate review, there is no analytical difference between a jury view and a court
view. The policy underlying this rule of law is clear: the record must reflect the evidence upon
which the finder of fact made its decision. This Court is simply unable to evaluate the basis of
factual determinations made upon the basis of a view.
These rules remained intact when this Court adopted the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1958. Under LR.C.P. 43(f), during a trial, the court may order that the court or jury may view
the property that is subject to the action. This Court addressed the substantive weight afforded to
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a court view in Lobdell v. State ex reI. Bd. of Highway Dir., a case involving an inverse
condemnation. 89 Idaho 559,407 P.2d 135 (1965). In Lobdell, after the judge had viewed the
property in question, the district court granted an offset to the plaintiff for restoration of access to
their property that had been limited by curbing constructed by the defendant. Id. at 563, 407
P.2d at 137. This Court held the district court erred when it entered findings based on the results
of an examination of the premises and noted that an inspection of the premises is only useful to
evaluate and apply the evidence submitted at trial. Id. at 567-68, 407 P.2d at 139-40.
Idaho is not alone in adhering to this rule: Bd. of Educ. of Claymont Special Sch. Dist v.

13 Acres of Land in Brandywine Hundred, 131 A.2d 180 (Del. 1957); Dade County v. Renedo,
147 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1962); Derrick v. Rabun County, 129 S.E.2d 583 (Ga. 1963); State v.

Simerlein, 325 N.E.2d 503 (Ind. App. 1975); Guinn v.Iowa & St. L. R. Co., 109 N.W. 209 (Iowa
1906); State v. Lee, 63 P.2d 135 (Mont. 1936); State by State Highway Comm'r v. Gorga, 149

A.2d 266 (N.J. 1959); Myra Found. v. Us., 267 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1959) (applying North
Dakota law); In re Appropriation of Worth, 183 N.E.2d 159 (Ohio 1962); Port of Newport v.

Haydon, 478 P.2d 445 (Or. App. 1970); Durika v. Sch. Dist. of Derry Township, 203 A.2d 474
(Pa. 1964); Ajootian v. Dir. of Pub. Works, 155 A.2d 244 (R.I. 1959) (stating rule in dicta only);

Townsend v. State, 43 N.W.2d 458 (Wis. 1950).
As previously noted, the district court found that the prescriptive easement turned ninety
degrees to the south from the access road immediately upon entering Parcel B. This finding was
not supported by substantial and competent evidence. The district court found that historically,
the prescriptive easement "turned south on to defendants' land" and "'disappeared'" after
crossing into Parcel B. We have carefully examined the exhibits upon which both Appellants
and Respondents rely, as well as those addressed by the district court in its Order on Remand.
There was testimony in the record, offered by Richard Peplinski, that the prescriptive easement
traveled in a western direction across Parcel B for at least 125 feet before it curved onto his
property to provide access to a Quonset hut. Although the Akers claim that the evidence on this
subject is conflicting, we are not so persuaded. The aerial photograph upon which the Akers rely
clearly shows a roadway resembling a shepherd's crook, extending well east into Parcel B before
curving back to the southwest toward the Quonset hut. The exhibits offered by the Respondents
are similar. All exhibits are consistent with Peplinski's testimony and reveal that the access road
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traveled east into Parcel B before curving back towards the Quonset hut on Parcel A. For these
reasons, we find this finding to be clearly erroneous.
The district court erred when it relied on its site view to find the scope of the easement
and the district court's finding regarding the location of the easement on Parcel B is not based
upon substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, the judgment establishing the location and
scope of Appellants' easement must be vacated.
B. The district court's award of compensatory and punitive damages must be vacated.
The district court also erred when it reinstated the damage award from Akers 1. That
damage award was based, in part, upon the district court's view of the premises. The district
court awarded the Akers trespass damages resulting from Appellants' efforts to improve the road
on Parcel B. These improvements consisted of excavation and the dumping of fill to provide a
road base. The district court found that these activities occurred to the west of where it located
Appellants' prescriptive easement on Parcel B. We have determined that the district court's
factual finding as to the location of the easement on Parcel B is clearly erroneous. The district
court specifically found that it had "viewed the area, and

fI ound]

such excavation to have

occurred further to the west of where the road immediately went into what would be the exact
northeast comer of what is now [Parcel A]." The damage award also compensated the Akers for
Appellants' trespass outside the scope of Appellants 12.2-foot prescriptive easement across
Government Lot 2. As indicated above, the district court's finding that the scope of Appellants'
prescriptive easement was 12.2 feet in width was based upon the district court's view of the
premises. Accordingly, the entirety of the trespass damages award must be vacated.
The district court's determination of damages for emotional distress and its award of
punitive damages related to conduct by Appellants in the course of that which the district court
determined to be trespass. As the scope of trespass, if any, will be determined in a new trial, we
vacate the entire award of compensatory and punitive damages. For the same reason, the district
court's award of attorney fees and costs to the Akers is vacated.
C. This matter will be reassigned to a new district judge to conduct a new trial.
Normally, we would remand the case to the district court for additional findings of fact
and conclusions of law.

However, given the animosity woven into this case, we find it

appropriate to remand the case for assignment to a new district judge. In fairness to the district
judge, and the parties as well, we think it a difficult and uncomfortable task for the district judge
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to now revisit and re-evaluate the evidence, disregarding his own earlier observations and factual
determinations, particularly in light of allegations by Appellants that he cannot act impartially.
Although such allegations rarely warrant reassignment, appellate courts in other jurisdictions
have found it best to assign cases to a new trial judge in certain limited circumstances. See Beck
v. Beck, 766 A.2d 482, 485 (Del. 2001); In re Guardianship of Lienemann, Not Reported in
N. W.2d, 2004 WL 420158 (Neb. App. 2004); In re Guardianship of R. G. and F., 382 A.2d 654,
658 (N.J. 1977); In re Custody ofA.L.A.P.-G., Not Reported in P.3d, 2003 WL 22234910 (Wash.
App.2003). This case is one of the rare instances in which reassignment is appropriate.

D. Neither party will receive an award of attorney fees on appeal.
The Akers and the Mortensens have each requested an award of attorney fees on appeal.
As the Akers have not prevailed in this appeal, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees.
We cannot conclude that the Akers have frivolously defended this appeal. Accordingly, we deny
the Mortensens' request for an award of attorney fees.
IV. CONCLUSION
The judgment is vacated and this case is remanded for a new trial before a different
judge. Costs to Appellants.

Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and Justice Pro Tern
TROUT, CONCUR.
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